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Abstract
Over the past decades, research in cognitive and affective neuroscience has emphasized that emotion
is crucial for human intelligence and in fact inseparable from cognition. Concurrently, there has been a
significantly growing interest in simulating and modeling emotion in robots and artificial agents. Yet,
existing models of emotion and their integration in cognitive architectures remain quite limited and
frequently disconnected from neuroscientific evidence. We argue that a stronger integration of emotion
in  robot  models  is  critical  for  the  design  of  intelligent  machines  capable  of  tackling  real  world
problems. Drawing from current neuroscientific knowledge, we provide a set of guidelines for future
research in artificial emotion and intelligent machines more generally.
Emotion is critical for the flexible, intelligent behavior of biological organisms. Accordingly, multiple
attempts to model emotion in robots and artificial agents have been described in the last decades. Yet,
how  emotion  is  modeled  and  how  it  interfaces  with  “cognitive  architectures”  remains  poorly
developed. We argue that current shortcomings are due to the design of artificial emotion in a manner
that is largely disconnected from recent neuroscientific evidence. 
Several robotics and artificial intelligence proposals take inspiration from biological cognition (e.g.
Mnih et al, 2015; Cully et al., 2015; Moulin-Frier et al., 2017; Doncieux et al., 2018). In many of these,
reinforcement learning is used as a model of autonomous learning and decision-making, providing
good  examples  of  fruitful  interactions  between  neuroscience  and  artificial  intelligence  (Neftci  &
Averbeck,  2019).  However,  the  framework  of  reinforcement  learning  does  not  encompass  critical
components of natural emotion; it primarily addresses processes related to operant learning and simple
forms of decision-making (see review by Moerland et al., 2018). More generally, and as argued in the
present piece, emotion is not sufficiently incorporated into robotics.
Here, we begin by reviewing the literature on emotion modeling in robots and artificial agents. We
discuss  existing  proposals  with  respect  to  five  criteria:  embodiment,  behavior,  architecture  design,
theoretical  approach,  and  goal.  Our  proposed  classification  is  aimed  at  bridging  the  gap  between
computational models of emotion employed in robotics and the neuroscience of emotion. Critically, we
emphasize recent findings in brain science that reveal how emotion and cognition are integrated at
multiple levels of the brain. We then translate such insights into guidelines for the development of
future models of emotion in intelligent machines capable of tackling real-world problems. 
1. Virtual and robotic models of emotion
Over the past few decades, there has been growing interest in simulating and modeling emotion in
machines like robots and virtual artificial agents across multiple research fields, including affective
computing,  social  robotics,  neurorobotics,  and computer  animation.  Due to  the  specificity  of  each
discipline in terms of their engineering perspective and research goals, existing proposals are fairly
disconnected from one another. However, progress in the field requires identifying common themes
while understanding particular requirements and/or goals of the approaches adopted. We propose that
the existing research landscape be understood in terms of five criteria, as follows.
1.1. Embodiment: physical vs. virtual
A  straightforward  dimension  of  artificial  emotion  is  to  consider  agent  embodiment:  physical
embodiment (robot) or virtual embodiment (e.g. animated virtual character). Kismet (Breazeal, 2003),
Berenson (Karaouzene et al., 2013), and EMYS (Correira et al., 2016) are expressive robots designed
to  interact  with  humans.  They have  actuators  controlling  eye  and mouth  movements  with enough
degrees of freedom to mimic stereotypical emotional facial  expressions.  While some platforms are
based  on  more  anthropomorphic  robot  faces  (e.g.  Wu  et  al.,  2009),  simpler  ones  display  facial
expressions  on  a  screen  (e.g.  Masuyama  et  al.,  2018).  Another  aspect  that  applies  to  physically
embodied but non-expressive robots pertains to developing “behavioral regulation” capabilities during
task  performance  (e.g.  Avila-Garcia  &  Cañamero  2004;  Krichmar,  2013;  Belkaid  et  al.,  2018).
However,  while  benefiting  from  real  physical  embodiment,  robotic  models  suffer  from  limited
behavioral repertoires given the inherent difficulties of movement generation in mechanical systems.
In  the  domain  of  virtual  embodiment,  3-D  animated  avatars  exhibit  rich  non-verbal  behaviors
(gestures,  postures,  and  facial  expressions),  in  addition  to  verbal  utterances  that  convey  socio-
emotional cues to human users. Several computational models of emotion have been implemented on
conversational virtual agents (e.g. Gratch & Marsella, 2004; Gebhard, 2005), and Greta (Pelachaud,
2009) and MARC (Courgeon & Clavel, 2013) are well-established platforms. To increase the feeling of
immersion, animated virtual agents can be integrated in virtual reality (Martin et al., 2011; Ochs et al.,
2016),  giving  users  a  sense  of  situated  interaction.  Nevertheless,  these  applications  suffer  from
limitations due to the absence of physical interaction with the real world.
1.2. Behavior: social vs. non-social
Another distinction can be made in terms of the nature of the behavior exhibited by the machine. The
majority of artificial emotion models focus on social behavior for the purpose of facilitating human-
machine interactions: selecting verbal utterances for customer service chatbots (Yacoubi & Sabouret,
2018), interacting with and learning from museum visitors (Karaouzene et al., 2013), and mixing verbal
and non-verbal behaviors in companion robots (Saint-Aimé et al., 2009; Correira et al., 2016) or virtual
trainers (Gratch & Marsella, 2004). But there is a lot more to emotion than just social behaviors, and
some models address questions such as approach and avoidance behavior in foraging (Krichmar, 2013),
as well as competitive foraging (Avila-Garcia & Cañamero 2004). Another example is the modulation
of attention by emotion-related factors in visual search (Belkaid et al., 2017).
1.3. Architecture design: modular vs. integrative
Modularity  is  an important engineering design principle.  Many cognitive architectures,  like other
designed systems, are modular (e.g. Breazeal, 2003; Courgeon & Clavel, 2013; Correira et al., 2016).
Accordingly, when emotion is added to the overall system architecture, frequently it takes the form of a
separate module which interacts with other components. In this context, emotion is often conceived as
a simple “bias” mechanism that up- or down-regulates other system functions; for example, sensory
processing might be increased, or cognitive functions may be deemphasized. In contrast, integrative
approaches highlight the interdependence between emotion and cognition in the system (e.g. Avila-
Garcia  &  Cañamero  2004;  Belkaid  et  al.,  2018).  The  modularity  of  the  overall  architecture  of
intelligent systems is an essential design decision, and a growing literature provides evidence for the
integration of emotion and cognition in the brain (Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Pessoa,  2008; 2013;
Grossberg, 2018).
1.4. Theoretical approach: top-down vs. bottom-up
Some computational models of emotion take direct inspiration from emotion theories developed by
psychologists, and explicitly instantiate theoretical principles in what can be referred to as a top-down
fashion. For example, the ALMA model (Gebhard, 2005) is based on a combination of two theoretical
models, the cognitive-based framework developed by Ortony and colleagues (Ortony et al., 1988) and
the Pleasure-Arousal-Dominance scheme by Russell and Mehrabian (1977). The EMA model (Gratch
& Marsella,  2004)  implements  the  appraisal  and  coping  theory  proposed  by  Lazarus  (1991), and
TEATIME (Yacoubi  & Sabouret,  2018) implements  the action-tendency theory proposed by Frijda
(1986). In contrast, artificial emotion can be approached in a bottom-up fashion by focusing on the
implementation of specific aspects of natural emotion. For example, Avila-Garcia & Cañamero (2004)
propose a hormone-like mechanism as part of homeostatic action selection processes to address the
problem of  resource competition (see also Krichmar,  2013).  In  another  application,  Boucenna and
colleagues (2014) investigated how a robotic system can learn to recognize facial expressions in an
unsupervised fashion (i.e.  without explicit labels).  We note that bottom-up approaches can actually
complement and inform existing emotion theories by providing concrete implementations of processes
that are otherwise outlined descriptively (Belkaid et al., 2018).
1.5. Research goal: application-oriented vs. modeling-oriented
In general terms, artificial  emotion systems can be distinguished based on their  research goal.  A
subset of the literature is application-oriented, with the goal of generating human-like reactions in order
to enrich interactions with a human user (e.g. Breazeal, 2003; Pelachaud, 2009). Particular applications
include elderly care (Correira et al., 2016) and high-stakes decision-making (Gratch & Marsella, 2004).
A complementary  goal  is  to  model  mechanisms  of  natural  emotion  to  evaluate  and  test  existing
frameworks (e.g. Krichmar, 2013; Belkaid et al., 2018). As discussed below, we believe computational
and robotic models will  play an increasingly important role in advancing the understanding of the
neural basis of emotion.
2. Natural emotion: brain, body, and behavior
How emotion-related processes are modeled in robot and artificial agents often contrasts sharply with
current  knowledge about  biological  emotion.  In  the  following,  we summarize  key findings  of  the
neuroscientific literature that highlight the gap between natural and artificial emotion. In particular, we
stress the integration between emotion and cognition in humans and animals at multiple levels: brain,
body, and behavior.
2.1. Emotion and the brain
Historically, the brain basis of emotion was conceptualized in an area-centric manner.  For a long
period, the hypothalamus was believed to be the emotion center, shifting to the amygdala in the 1980s.
In the last decades, not only has the number of regions of the “emotional brain” increased steadily, but
how they function via complex circuits is starting to be unraveled. These regions include the medial
prefrontal  cortex,  the orbitofrontal  cortex,  the  cortex of  the  insula,  the  thalamus,  and many more.
Critically,  rather  than  being  functionally  localized  in  specific  areas,  emotion-related  processes  are
implemented by distributed neural circuits that rely on multiple structures at the same time (Pessoa,
2017; Tovote et al. 2015; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012).
More broadly, the classical separation between emotion and cognition has been gradually eroded.
Behind the blurring of their boundaries is the notion that mental processes are implemented via large-
scale, distributed networks (Sporns, 2010). The networks that have been uncovered in the context of
cognitive processes share many nodes (i.e. regions) with those that are important for emotion (Najafi et
al., 2016). Thus, neural computations underlying behavior are implemented via overlapping networks.
In this manner, specific brain areas affiliate, or group with, multiple large-scale networks depending on
behavioral demands.
Even more generally, the separation between mental domains such as perception, cognition, action,
motivation,  and emotion,  while  possibly  suitable  for  a  textbook organization,  does  not  reflect  the
organization  of  the  brain.  To  understand  how the  brain  generates  complex,  flexible,  and  adaptive
behaviors it is necessary to understand how brain circuits disrespect standard boundaries. In a very real
sense, the domains cannot be separated. 
2.2. Emotion and the body
Intelligence is not a mere collection of computations occurring in the central  nervous system but
result from the coupling of the brain, the body, and the environment (Varela et al., 1992; O’Regan &
Noë, 2001). From this perspective of embodied cognition, emotion is rooted in homeostatic processes
that guarantee bodily integrity, and the associated construction of bodily representations capturing the
state of body at any instant. These key functions engage both subcortical and cortical areas. Thus,
neuroscientifically  grounded theories  of  emotion attribute  a  central  role  to  the body in emotional-
related  processes.  For  example,  in  the  core  affect  theory,  bodily  states  are  central  to  emotional
experience (Russell, 2003). In the somatic marker theory, associations between particular situations and
patterns  of elicited physiological  and emotional  reactions  are  established, and help shape behavior
(Damasio et al., 1996).
2.3. Emotion and behavior
Emotion  expressions,  including  those  such  as  facial  expressions,  gestures,  and  postures,  are  an
important feature of the relationship between emotion and the body (de Gelder et al., 2015; Cowen et
al., 2019). The variety and complexity of processes involved in emotion expression and recognition
underlines their importance in human social behaviors. 
Emotion-behavior coupling is not limited to communicative functions but is also strongly related to
motivation and action generation (Frijda 1986; Blakemore & Vuilleumier, 2017). In living organisms,
motivated  behaviors  are  represented  in  terms  of  approach  and  avoidance.  Even  ostensibly  simple
behaviors  like  escape  leverage  complex  cognitive-emotional  processes  (Evans  et  al.,  2019).  More
generally, survival – and autonomous function – depends on the ability to generate flexible behaviors
and to adapt to dynamical environments. In sum, how an organism acts in its environment is a key
problem that  depends on emotion-related  processes,  which  therefore  is  not  confined to  generating
expressive behaviors for communication.
3. Toward better models of emotion
The brief review of the previous section points to several promising research directions. We propose
four principles for the development of artificial emotion in the next generation of intelligent machines:
 Emotion models should account for emotion-cognition integration
 Emotion models should subscribe to principles of embodiment
 Emotion models should support both social and non-social behaviors 
 Emotion models should inform research on natural emotion
3.1. Account for emotion-cognition integration
Consider a traditional architecture with standard components such as perception and decision-making
(Figure 1A). Recognizing the utility of considering affective information, models have included an
emotion component that interfaces with some of its processing components. We argue, however, that
emotion and cognition should be integrated in the overall architecture such that emotion is involved in
all cognitive processes (Figure 1B). In other words, emotion cannot be implemented as an “add on” to
an  existing  cognitive  machine,  for  example,  where  it  boosts  certain  perceptual  and  decisional
components based on urgency or threat. 
Although Figure 1B illustrates the need to blur the boundary between emotion and the rest of the
architecture, emotional computations must be specified at a sublevel that is sufficiently granular to
allow  the  translation  of  this  principle  into  concrete  implementations.  Consider  the  example  of
attention,  a central  cognitive operation.  A fruitful way to conceptualize attention is in terms of
priority maps (Itti et al., 1998). In particular, the priority of a to-be-attended visual item depends on a
series of factors, including stimulus salience and top-down control, which can respectively labeled as
perceptual and cognitive factors. Critically, priority also depends on affective and motivational factors
(Anderson  and  Phelps,  2001;  Anderson  et  al.,  2011).  For  example,  an  item paired  with  aversive
consequences in the past will acquire negative significance, and gain prioritized processing so that it
can be adequately handled. Likewise, an item paired with reward in the past will acquire motivational
significance.  Combined, the determination of priority integrates multiple factors that are needed to
determine overall object relevance (Figure 1C).
As  another  example,  consider  executive  control (also  called  “cognitive  control”),  which
includes  operations  involved  in  maintaining  and  updating  information,  monitoring  conflict  and/or
errors, resisting distracting information, inhibiting prepotent responses, and shifting goals. A useful way
to conceptualize executive control is in terms of a set of processes, including inhibition, updating, and
shifting (Miyake et al., 2000). Insofar as value, relevance, significance, and so on, need to be taken into
account for proper executive control, emotion/motivation participate in these processes. In other words,
objects  or  contexts  that  influence  cognitive  control  processes  such  that  rewards  (respectively,
punishments) ensue, become positively (respectively, negatively) relevant. Why is the architecture in
Figure 1A not sufficient? After all, information about what is emotionally/motivationally relevant will
be conveyed to the particular architecture components. The central reason is that influences must be
bidirectional  (Figure  1D).  For  example,  dealing  with  an  emotional  stimulus  or  situation  requires
multiple adjustments, including “updating” to refresh the contents of working memory, “shifting” to
switch the current task subgoal, or “inhibiting” to cancel previously planned actions. In this manner,
resources are coordinated in the service of proper function.
3.2. Subscribe to principles of embodiment
To stress  the  importance  of  embodiment  for  artificial  intelligence,  roboticists  often  use  arguments
related to  morphology and physical interaction with the environment  (Brooks,  1991;  Pfeifer et  al.,
2007). As an example, consider a system that must learn the concept of a “chair”. Purely vision-based
approaches (e.g. using deep neural networks) would need a massive amount of data and would only be
Figure 1: Emotion integration in robot cognitive architectures. A) Traditional cognitive architecture 
in which emotion interacts with other components. Whereas such architecture seemingly acknowledges
an important role for emotion, it is problematic because it implies that emotion is an added module 
that can in fact be turned off or disconnected from others. B) Architecture in which the separation 
between emotion and other components is blurred. This representation emphasizes that emotion is an 
integral element of the system. C) Attention represented as a collection of priority maps which are 
combined to determine which elements in the environment the robot has to attend to. Priority maps are 
based on multiple factors: perceptual (e.g. based on saliency), cognitive (e.g. based on current plan), 
but also emotional/motivational (e.g. based on value, relevance, significance). D) Executive control is 
based on a set of operations such as inhibiting, updating and shifting. These functions need to take 
emotional factors (e.g. value, relevance, significance) into account to support successful autonomous 
adaptive behavior. At the same time, the very same functions help determine factors such as value, 
relevance, and significance.
able to recognize chairs by shape. In contrast, a humanoid robot able to sit on a flat surface could learn
that sitting minimizes energy loss and thus start to learn the functional aspects of chairs. In other words,
disembodied machines cannot make sense of the world the same way humans do. As far as emotion is
concerned, the same reasoning applies. For instance, facial expression recognition should be embedded
in a system that can produce expressive behavior and associate it with its own internal states in order to
process what  is  being expressed by the system itself  or others.  Otherwise,  it  is  little  more than a
detection device of stereotypical patterns labeled as ‘happy’ or ‘afraid’. 
When addressing emotion embodiment in artificial systems, there has been a focus on how emotion is
expressed through the  body (e.g.  emotion  recognition  in  computer  vision,  face  actuators  in  social
robotics, synthesis of social cues in computer animation). But, for models of emotion and cognition to
be  more  truly  embodied,  the  behavior  they  implement  must  be  driven  by  core  bodily  signals  of
pleasure, pain, satiation, energy depletion, and so on (Figure 2A; see also Froese & Ziemke (2009) and
Man & Damasio (2019)).  Indeed, in the previous section,  we stressed how emotional/motivational
factors of value, relevance, and significance are important for proper autonomous function. This type of
information is  rooted  in  the  bodily  responses  that  a  stimulus  or  event  elicits:  reward  is  processed
through signals of pleasure, harm avoidance stems from the sensation of physical pain and the drive to
preserve physical integrity, such that the successful execution of higher-order goals partly depends on
the  association  between  a  set  of  actions  with  the  physiological  responses  they  trigger.  Therefore,
Figure 2: Embodiment and emotion for intelligent robots. A) As embodied intelligent machines, 
robots are able to acquire information about, and to act upon, the world through a variety of sensors 
and actuators. The notion of embodiment also includes the processing and regulation of bodily signals 
such as pleasure, pain, satiation, and so on, which is crucial for emotion and for autonomous behavior.
B) By integrating emotion in robotics architectures, we can design machines able to generate and 
coordinate intelligent behaviors for survival, exploration, and high-level goals. The illustration of iCub
robot in A) was reproduced with permission from Antoni Gracia.
building a robot capable of autonomously and intelligently exploring an unknown environment requires
mechanisms to monitor energy level,  avoid physical harm, develop a preference for safe locations,
attend to objects which are relevant to goals/plans, and switch between goals and behaviors depending
on current own and external states (Figure 2B), all of which rely on embodied emotional-cognitive
processes.
3.3 Support both social and non-social behaviors and interactions 
Models  of  emotion  tend to  focus  on either  social  or  non-social  interactions.  For  example,  facial
expression recognition on the one hand and autonomous navigation on the other. Frequently, engineers
are interested in simulating socio-emotional competence to make human-machine interactions more
user-friendly. Although social interaction is a major domain in which emotion is involved, we believe
emotion  modeling  should  encompass  both  social  and  non-social  behaviors.  Indeed,  the  examples
developed previously highlight the key role of emotion in autonomous, flexible behaviors. 
Considering both social and non-social emotional processing can be beneficial. For example, how to
process social and non-social stimuli that are self-relevant (Figure 3A), how to switch between social
and non-social goals, and how to learn which actions are more goal-conducive from both social and
non-social signals (Figure 3B). From an engineering perspective, autonomous cars could be safer for
humans if  they had the capacity to  interpret social  cues (e.g.  pedestrian patterns and interactions);
industrial  robots  could  be  more  efficient  if  they  were  able  to  manage  both  independent  and
Figure 3: Social and non-social interactions with the environment. Emotion is key to intelligent 
behavior, both in social and non-social contexts. It is important for models of emotion to implement 
mechanisms that handle adequately both social and non-social stimuli (A), and to process both social 
and non-social rewards (B).
collaborative tasks; and companion robots could be more engaging and fun if they could develop a
“personality” from both social and non-social experiences.
3.4 Inform research on natural emotion and cognition
While it is in theory possible to engineer intelligent machines differently from living organisms, we
believe it is enormously beneficial to take cues from how biology gives rise to intelligent behaviors. To
go  a  step  further,  we  advocate  that  machines  be  conceived  as  models  which  can  further  our
understanding of human intelligence through the process of recreating it. Can we build a machine able
to process different types of stimuli and events, to safely explore an unknown environment, to self-
regulate and adapt its behavior to a variety of contexts, to develop long-term knowledge, preferences,
goals and relationships? In doing so, designing intelligent machine can benefit not only from but also to
the study of natural intelligence.
Models  can  inform research  on  human  emotion  and cognition  at  four  levels:  1)  testing  existing
theories, 2) proposing new theories, 3) proposing new experiments, and 4) creating opportunities for
new experiments (Figure 4). For instance, does the current understanding of how we process social and
non-social stimuli (e.g. threatening face vs. snake) suffice to implement similar mechanisms in a robot?
This type of questioning allows the assessment of the current state of knowledge, revealing ambiguities
and missing pieces of the puzzle (level 1). For example, how is processing prioritized when in the
presence of various distractors? To which extent does the triggered response depend on learning? What
series  of  computations  leads  to  appropriate  responses?  The  process  of  testing  theories  should  be
hypothesis-driven and based on scientific knowledge, rather than solution-oriented (i.e. engineering a
functional system) to lead to new theories (level 2). The process can then suggest new experimental
designs to test  the validity of the proposed hypotheses (level 3), Furthermore, modeling intelligent
behavior in machines enables innovative experimental research (level 4). An example of an emerging
question is the investigation of factors that lead humans to consider machines as social agents (Wiese et
al., 2017; Belkaid et al.,  in preparation). More generally, robots offer a unique opportunity to create
embodied real-time interactions to address questions about human social cognition.
Conclusion
In this paper,  we proposed a framework for designing intelligent, autonomous machines which is
centered  on  the  integration  between  cognition  and  emotion.  Recent  advances  in  neuroscience
emphasize  the  importance  of  emotion  in  human  intelligence,  and  stress  their  interdependent
relationship, as well as the brain’s interactions with the body and the environment. Modeling emotion
and fully  integrating it  in  “cognitive architectures” is  thus  key to  building robots  able to  function
independently  in  diverse  and  challenging  real-world  situations.  We  hope  our  proposal  helps  in
developing research guidelines for future research. More generally, we encourage a closer collaboration
between roboticists, computer-scientists, and neuroscientists for the sake of fruitful cross-fertilizations
between fields. 
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